Abstract -This paper is to address the basics, the limitations and the relationship between component reliability and system reliability through a study of flight computing architectures and related avionics components for launch vehicles for NASA future missions. Component reliability analysis and system reliability analysis need to be evaluated at the same time, and the limitations of each analysis and the relationship between the two need to be fully understood to ensure mission success.
INTRODUCTION
A comprehensive components/parts management program and a system reliability and maintainability (R&M) program are required by NASA for all spaceflight and critical ground support systems to control risk and enhance reliability. The component management program includes components selection, review, verification, approval, traceability, testing, packaging, storage, acquisition, and application [1] , while the system R&M program addresses system R&M design and operational performance requirements, R&M engineering analysis and integration, and risk assessment and management [2] .
System reliability analysis typically assumes exponential distributions for the components' time to failure. However, depending on workmanship conditions, use conditions, and effectiveness of screening procedures, components may not always operate in the constant failure region, where the exponential distribution is assumed for system reliability analysis. Without a comprehensive component management program, it is possible that components may yield early failures or infant mortality or sometimes even wear-out failures under certain use conditions. Therefore, component reliability analysis and system reliability analysis should not be considered separately, but rather be evaluated at the same time, while fully understanding the limitations of each analysis and the relationship between the two is the key.
In this paper, a number of flight computing architectures and related avionics components for launch vehicles are studied, in an attempt to address the fundamental differences between the basics of component reliability and system reliability, and the impact of component reliability on system reliability. In addition, this paper provides insight into the limitations of system reliability analysis, the misconceptions of either using system reliability to direct component selection or interpreting system reliability in absolute values without fully understanding the assumptions the analysis is based upon. It also highlights the important relationship between parts reliability and system reliability, along with their implementation for space applications which require a high level of reliability for the missions.
II. SYSTEM RELIABILITY OF COMPUTING ARCHITECTURES
Various avionics computing architectures similar to existing designs are examined in response to a potential future need to assess and/or design avionics computing architectures for a launch vehicle. Twelve computing architectures were initially assessed and six representative architectures were selected for detailed study from perspectives of reliability, mass, power, data integrity, software implementation, and hardware and software integration [3] The selected architectures include both voting (a, b and c) and self-checking (d, e and f) architectures, with either bussed (c, e and f) or switched (a, b and d) interconnections, and with various levels of cross-strapping (a, d and c are fully crossstrapped, b is partially cross-strapped, and c and f are channelized). Thus, the architectures have a sampling of highly-crossed and highly channelized architectures, a mix of self-checking/triplex-voting architectures, and switch/bussed architectures.
To compare the reliability, mass and power of all the architectures, the same types of instrumentation, i.e. sensors and effectors, was assumed for a representative stage with various flight computing configurations and topologies in interconnects. In this way analysis would not be biased by specific architecture implementations. It is also assumed i) all architectures are one-fault tolerant by design, ii) only hard or non-recoverable failure modes are considered and no common cause failure modes are included, and iii) the failure rate and failure criteria for each type of sensors and effectors are the same.
The sensors and effectors include: flight computer (FC), data acquisition unit (DAU), pyro initiation controller (PIC), thrust vector controller (TVC), Rate Gyro Assembly (RGA), Inertial Navigation Unit (INU), Engine Control Unit (ECU), Main Propulsion System (MPS), Reaction Control System Controller (RCSC), Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU), CrossChannel Data Link (CCDL), self-check logic, switches, data buses, cables and connectors. As examples, the fully crossstrapped voter FCSSTV and the channelized bussed selfchecking pairs CBSC are shown in Figures 1 and 2 with more architecture and data flow details in [3] . For system reliability analysis, all the selected computing architectures are modeled by Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Analysis, Cut Set Analysis, and Importance Measure Analysis [3, 4] . Figure 3 shows the reliability plots for the six architectures assuming the mean time to failure (MTTF) of each component follows an exponential distribution. Table 1 summarizes the architecture reliability at 24 hours and 9 months for comparison. Even though the fully cross-strapped voter FCSSTV seems to have the highest reliability, there is no significant reliability difference among the partially crossstrapped voter PCSSTV, the fully cross-strapped switched self-checking pairs FCSSC or the fully cross-strapped bussed self-checking pairs FCSBSC. Meanwhile, the level of channelization seems to have the most impact on reliability, with the channelized bussed voter CBTV and the channelized bussed self-checking pairs CBSC having the lowest reliability numbers.
A simple interpretation from Figure 3 and Table 1 may indicate that a less stringent component program is needed for a launch vehicle or a short mission, or that turning off the avionics system regularly may help improve the architecture reliability over a relatively long time period. Both concepts fail to consider either the assumptions associated with the system reliability analysis or the assumptions associated with component reliability and, therefore, are mistaken.
Left: Figure 3 . Reliability plots for the architectures assuming exponential distributions for all components. Right: Table 1 . Architecture Reliability.
When proper assumptions are made, such as the assumptions described above, system reliability analysis is an excellent approach for comparisons among the architectures and for correlation of the component contribution to the system reliability and therefore leading to system reliability improvement through component reliability enhancement. However, the assumptions and limitations of the system reliability analysis need to be fully considered, along with the understanding of the various impacts of component reliability on system reliability, so that the results of system reliability are interpreted along with component reliability to avoid jumping to a misleading conclusion.
III. COMPONENT RELIABILITY IMPACT ON SYSTEM RELIABILITY
While system reliability analysis is mainly based on statistics, component reliability analysis relies on statistics as well as technology and physics of failure.
A. Statistics
The system reliability analysis performed above assumes that a component's time to failure follows an exponential distribution. The probability density function of the exponential distribution is exp
where λ is the rate parameter. The MTTF of the exponential distribution is
The probability density function of the Weibull distribution is exp
where α is the scale parameter and β is the shape parameter. MTTF of the Weibull distribution is 
where Г(z) is the gamma function.
Since MTTF is the defining parameter for the component reliability statistics for system reliability analysis assuming an exponential distribution, we can translate the exponential distributions used in the system reliability analysis into a set of Weibull distributions keeping the same MTTF, i.e. by defining a set of α and β pairs for Weibull using (2) and (4) assuming .
An example of the probability density function and the cumulative density function of the Weibull distributions with β ranging from 0.5 to 2 having the same MTTF as the exponential distribution for a component are plotted in Figure  4 hours, the reliability of the component is lower with a smaller β compared to a larger β, and after 40,000 hours, the reliability of the component is lower with a larger β than with a smaller β. Therefore, there is a cross-over effect for the cumulative density function of the Weibull distributions with β ranging from 0.5 to 2. This means the impact and the degree of the impact of the component reliability on the system reliability of a fixed system topology is not a constant over time. 
B. Component Failure Modes
It is well-known that the bathtub curve is associated with the Weibull distribution with different β values, and the shape parameter β corresponds to the different failure modes for components, i.e., the infant mortality regime when β is less than 1, the random defects regime when β is equal to 1, and the wear-out regime when β is greater than 1.
The majority of failure or degradation mechanisms are accumulative, with some more aggravated at higher temperature, some more sensitive to thermal cycling, and some more prominent under bias or power-on condition. At the system level, the physics of those failure modes may not need to be fully considered, but the failure distributions assumed for each component for the system reliability analysis do need to be re-visited to ensure that at least the types of component failure distributions are selected correctly to reflect the expected and dominant failure modes for each component operating during the mission.
For example, if the exponential distribution is assumed for the components, then it should be recognized that the workmanship and proper build and assembly issues are not considered in the system reliability analysis. In other words, the results of system reliability analysis based on the exponential distribution being the component failure distribution can be misleading, if one or some of the components are not properly up-screened and/or are used under a certain bias condition where different failure modes may occur. One example would be the optocouplers [5] .
In addition, component failures or degradation resulting from radiation effects do not follow the exponential distribution either [6] . Radiation effects are typically evaluated and assessed separately from the system reliability analysis, and are required to be addressed differently, if the radiation data or statistics are included in the system reliability analysis.
On another note, some "failure modes" are not typically considered in the system reliability analysis, such as design failure, software failure, human error, delay in schedule, etc. While this should be recognized as one of the typical limitations in system reliability analysis, the topic is not focused on, in this paper, although it is at least as important in understanding the implications of the system reliability analysis at the project and program management level during the decision-making process.
C. Component Contribution to System Reliability
The contributions of each component to the system's unreliability for the architectures studied are shown in Figure  5 [4] , which indicates that the flight computers (FC) have the highest contribution compared to other components. To investigate the impact of component reliability changes through different β values on the architecture reliability, the reliability of all the six architectures were re-calculated using the approach described in sub-section A to define a set of Weibull distributions while keeping the same MTTF for the flight computers.
Please note again that, in this analysis, only one component type, i.e., flight computers, is assumed to have Weibull distributions with different β values while maintaining the Reliability plots for two architectures, the fully crossstrapped voter FCSSTV which has the highest level of architecture reliability and the channelized bussed selfchecking pairs CBSC which has the lowest level of architecture reliability shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 , are given in Figure 6 . From Figure 4 , we can see that the reliability of the component is lower with a smaller β compared to that with a larger β before the time of operation approaches 40,000 hours. Therefore, for a relatively short time such as 9-months (less than 7000 hours) in our case, smaller β values yield lower flight computer reliability and thus lower overall reliability for the architectures.
In addition, the differences between the overall architecture reliability for the two architectures are larger for smaller β values, which indicate that the workmanship and effectiveness of up-screening procedures of the components have a bigger contribution to the overall architecture reliability and, therefore, cannot be overlooked during the system reliability analysis and its interpretation. From Figures 7(a)-(d) , it can be seen that the differences between the reliability numbers of the six architectures are "shrinking" as the β value is getting lager. Since smaller β values correspond to infant mortality, it again shows that the workmanship and effectiveness of up-screening procedures of the components are the most influential differentiator for architecture reliability among various architectures and, therefore, are the deciding factor for architecture selection. A cross-over effect can be seen as well, when the relative reliability of the architectures changes over time. It is most evident in Figure 7 (d), where the channelized bussed selfchecking pairs CBSC is not the architecture with the lowest architecture reliability anymore during the time period between approximately 1000 hours and 4000 hours, but does have the lowest architecture reliability before 1000 hours and after 4000 hours. It should be noted that this cross-over happens for other architectures at different β values after 9-months but that will not be discussed here because the absolute system reliability numbers are of little importance for long time period as we will explain later in the next subsection.
This cross-over phenomenon may complicate the architecture selection process if the reliability of a component with a major contribution to the system unreliability has changed. It is possible that one architecture may be more suitable for certain missions while another may be for a different mission, simply because of changed/unchanged component reliability. However, no general rules can be concluded, in terms of the relationship between the component reliability or its percentage contribution to the system unreliability and whether or not a re-selection process for the architectures needs to be performed. Many factors impact the occurrence of the cross-over, including but not limited to architecture topologies and interconnections, component interactions and reliability, mission time, fault-tolerance and failure criteria, etc.
It should be noted that schedule and cost constraints may make it impractical to make a re-selection, and in this case, efforts should be focused on improving the system reliability by enhancing the reliability of the critical components. 5, along with Cut Set analysis, should be used to identify the critical components and system reliability improvement paths.
In addition to the architecture reliability changes shown in Figures 6-7 , the distributions of the component percentage contributions to the system unreliability have also changed. While the responses of the architectures to the β values may be different due to different contributing distributions for the components, it can be seen that, not only the contribution of the flight computers to the system unreliability is getting smaller as β becomes larger, but also the distribution of the contributing percentages keep changing as β changes. In this particular case, when β is equal to 2, flight computers are no longer the component type which contributes the most to the system unreliability.
This implies that the changing of the reliability of one component may lead to the a change in the overall system reliability as well to the individual component contributions, which, in turn, may impact the critical components and thus impact the paths to system reliability improvement. In other words, the reliability improvement paths may need to be reevaluated again, if the component reliability has changed after the initial architecture evaluation. For the same reasoning, a non-critical component may become a critical component when its reliability or that of another component changes.
Up to this point, we have assumed different β values for the flight computers only. Table 2 lists the 9-month architecture reliability when we assume the different β values for FC, PIC, ECU, INU and MPS. Those components are chosen for their different contributing percentages to the system unreliability. As shown in Figure 5 , these five component units account for 20-40%, 10-20%, 8-15%, 10%, and 2% of the system unreliability contributions, respectively. Therefore, Table 2 gives a snapshot of the impact of the component contributions to the system unreliability on the overall architecture reliability. It is worth of noting that the cross-over effect occurs for the partially cross-strapped voter PCSSTC, fully crossstrapped switched self-checking pairs FCSSC and fully crossstrapped bussed self-checking pairs FCSBSC at β equal to 0.5 for the flight computers. There is no other cross-over case for the 9-month time point; however, as we have pointed out earlier, the cross-over can happen at different time points for different architectures.
The previously mentioned "shrinking" effect of the differences between the architecture reliability numbers of the six architectures when β becomes larger is also evident for all architectures in Table 2 , which again indicates that the architecture reliability numbers are only valid when all the components have gone through effective up-screening and, therefore, are not subject to any early failures.
Meanwhile, the impact of multiple components on the architecture reliability has the same trend as that of the single component as described so far, with the actual architecture 
D. System Reliability and its Improvement
It is evident that the system reliability number decreases as the time period gets longer. It seems to be not an issue for short missions such as launch vehicles, but may be critical for long missions such as crew-vehicles. However, it needs to be pointed out that system reliability analysis should not be considered as the point estimate for the actual reliability prediction for a long mission in space [7] .
In addition to the data shown in [7] that the system reliability analysis does not predict the on-orbit system or mission performance, the role of the system reliability analysis is clearly defined in section 3.2 of MIL-HDBK-217F [8] that the "reliability prediction provides the quantitative baseline needed to assess progress in reliability engineering…. Once a design is selected, the reliability reduction may be used as a guide to improvement by showing the highest contributions to failure", and the limitations of the system reliability is stated in section 3.3 that "a reliability prediction should never be assumed to represent the expected field reliability as measured by the user… note that none of the applications discussed above require the predicted reliability to match the field measurement".
In other words, with proper statistical assumptions and component assumptions outlined so far, the system reliability analysis is a valuable methodology to enable architecture comparisons, to assist architecture selection, and to guide the system reliability improvements. A modified statistical model, such as Weibull or other distributions, can be relatively easily incorporated into the existing system reliability analysis to accommodate component failure distributions under operational conditions. Meanwhile, system reliability analysis enables reliability improvement by directing critical component reliability improvements, and/or adding component and/or module level redundancy, and/or keeping simple core-critical avionics architecture designs.
IV. COMPONENT SELECTION STRATEGY FOR SPACE MISISONS
Component or parts selection is one of the critical processes for space missions. NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8705.4 establishes baseline criteria to define the risk classification levels for NASA payloads, along with the design and test philosophy and the common assurance practices applicable to each level [9] . Table 3 provides a snapshot of several risk classification considerations, including component requirements and system reliability analysis requirements. "EEE parts" in Table 3 refers to electrical, electronic and electromechanical parts or components. The "level" of the EEE parts refer to the parts grade definition summarized in [10], with level 1 as the highest reliability or lowest risk for a component. Table 3 provides a guideline for a parts selection strategy. In certain circumstances, when a project does decide to accept a higher risk for its parts selection due to cost, schedule or other programmatic constraints, an understanding of the roles and limitations of the system reliability, the relationship between the component and system reliability, and the type and degree of impact of component reliability on the system reliability is critical to component selection and system reliability improvement for the mission.
A couple of misconceptions about component selection strategies that result from a misunderstanding of the nature of system reliability analysis or the relationship between the component reliability and the system reliability, are discussed below. Table 3 . Risk Classification Considerations for NASA Payloads [9] A. Misconception: Less Stringent Component Selection Plan for Shorter Missions Table 4 gives the system reliability of the architectures at 24 hours and 9 months with β ranging from 0.5 to 2, which does indicate that the architectures do have a different level of sensitivity to a change in β. For all architectures, the changes in the system reliability numbers are more evident for a longer time, i.e. the changes in system reliability are larger for the time period of 9-months compared to those for 24-hours. However, the channelized Beta architectures, i.e. both the voter CBTV and the self-checking pairs CBSC, whose system reliabilities are the lowest among the six architectures, are even more sensitive to β values compared to other architectures. For example, when β changes from 1 to 0.8, Table 4 shows that the number of "9"s for the two channelized architectures changes, while the number of "9"s for the four other architectures does not change.
Since β equal to 0.8 indicates an infant mortality region, when β changes from 1 to 0.8, it indicates that the component works in a region where earlier failure is possible. Thus, it means that the up-screening of the component to eliminate early failures is critical to mission success, even for a short mission, for the channelized voter CBTV and the selfchecking pairs CBSC architectures.
Therefore, the notion that shorter missions can have "less stringent" component plans is a misconception.
First of all, it depends on the actual architecture. Certain architectures are more sensitive to the changes of the component reliability and so more sensitive to a "less stringent" component plan. This means that a potential early failure for a component may have much greater impact on the system reliability for certain architectures.
Secondly, the "less stringent" component plan may very well yield a less stringent up-screening procedure, and thus yield a higher probability of operating components with early failures.
Thirdly, a "less stringent" parts plan typically suggests using "lower grade parts" and then "upgrading/up-screening" under certain circumstances, such as when parts are used for single string functions or on critical paths, etc., to eliminate the early failures. This "upgrading" process may turn out to be more costly. The cost model from NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program shows that, even though the purchase cost is higher for components with higher grade, the cost associated with upgrading and radiation assurance are much higher [11] .
Thus, it is a critical for any mission, short or long, to evaluate the risk, risk mitigation and impact of a "less stringent" parts selection plan on the architectures and the mission goals and requirements. Using a "less stringent" parts plan just because the mission is short is neither technically justified, nor cost-efficient, and risks a higher chance of a reduced system reliability, especially for certain architectures.
B. Misconception: System Reliability Analysis and System Level Testing are Sufficient for Component Selection and Component Level Testing
With higher purchase costs for higher grade components and, armed with testing data at the system level and a system reliability analysis showing an impressive number of "9s" for the mission, there is a notion that the results of system reliability analysis and testing can be used as the criterion to justify component selection or to replace component level testing. In other words, the notion basically indicates that as long as the system reliability analysis shows the "required" number of "9s", we can relax the parts plan and use system level testing to replace the component level testing.
This notion is a misconception again. While it overlooks the limitations of the system reliability analysis, it also underestimates the impact of component reliability on the system reliability. While the system reliability analysis directs the path to system reliability improvement, system reliability cannot improve component reliability, and testing at system level does not give full access to the component characteristics.
As we have demonstrated throughout the paper, the system level reliability analysis is valid only when all the components are operating at the bottom portion of the bathtub curve. In other words, component infant mortality or workmanship issues will trump any system level reliability, unless those early failure distributions at the component level are incorporated into the system reliability analysis.
It should be noted that this is not to say that the testing at system level does not contribute anything to component reliability; there are certain ways to "translate" the information based on testing configurations. Based on the translation, certain levels of testing at the component level can be selected which are necessary to properly address infant mortality of. the components.
Process control and effective up-screening testing can eliminate early failures due to cluster defects or workmanship issues to a certain level, and thus the combination of process controls and effective up-screen testing are required to ensure a high level of component reliability and so to achieve a high level of system reliability. It should be noted that both component and system reliability have a statistical nature, and there is no 100% guarantee that any component will have zero failures in the application. Up-screening testing needs to be performed at both component level and system level.
With studies showing that about 40% of failures occurred during the first year of operation [12] [13] , elimination of component and sub-system early failures is the most critical to ensure mission success and long term reliability.
It always seems to be a question if a system or mission with higher grade parts has a higher level of mission reliability. A study based on the analysis of time to system failure from earth orbit data between 1983 and 2003 as a function of parts levels is shown in Figure 9 [11] . This indicates a clear correlation between the level of component reliability and system or mission reliability and maintainability. This does not imply that lesser grade parts cannot achieve mission objectives, but does suggest that a comprehensive parts plan which ensures a high level of component reliability is required to achieve system reliability goals and is critical to mission success.
With new component technologies and new architecture topologies available for mission design, an increase (instead of a reduction) of both component level and system level testing
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and analysis should occur. Elimination of component early failures due to process-induced clustered defects and/or workmanship related issues is the key and, in most cases, can be achieved only at the component level. Figure 9 . Time to system failure on-orbit [11] .
V. SUMMARY Through a study of flight computing architectures and related avionics components for launch vehicles, this paper addresses the basics, the roles, the limitations, the relationship between component reliability and system reliability analysis, and the impact of component reliability on system reliability.
With proper statistical and component assumptions, system reliability analysis is a valuable methodology to enable architecture comparisons, to assist architecture selection, and to guide system reliability improvements. Instead of the commonly assumed exponential distribution, other distributions such as Weibull or Lognormal can be, and in some cases, need to be applied to the system reliability analysis to address other component failure modes.
For space missions where a high level of reliability is required, it is critical to evaluate the risk, risk mitigations and impacts of the parts selection plan on the architectures and the mission goals and requirements. Notions that a "less stringent" parts plan should be sufficient for shorter missions and an attempt to use system reliability analysis and testing to justify component selection or reliability is not technically justified, since it overlooks the limitations of the system reliability analysis, and underestimates the impact of component reliability on system reliability.
Both system reliability analysis and component reliability analysis must be fully understood and fully implemented to ensure mission success.
